Previously, The Chinese victory is complete and the Indian defeat absolute, at least militarily. The Chinese have declared a ceasefire effective midnight November 21, 1962.

American assistance was returned honouring this declaration of ceasefire. India is faced with serious odds: humiliation coupled with a strong opposition.

Ceasefire…

“Beginning from…0000 hours on November 21, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will cease fire along the entire Sino-Indian border. Beginning from December 1^st, 1962, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 20 kilometers behind the line of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7^th, 1959. In the eastern sector, although the Chinese frontier guards have so far been fighting on Chinese territory north of the traditional customary line, [the pre-McMahon line along the foot of the hills] they are prepared to withdraw from their present positions to the north of the illegal McMahon Line, and to withdraw twenty kilometers back from that line. In the middle and western sectors, the Chinese frontier guards will withdraw twenty kilometers from the line of actual control.”

This is an extract from the Official Declaration of Ceasefire that Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai publicly announced on November 20, 1962. He had simply restated the compromise that he had been offering for over three years: India could keep the disputed Territory north to the McMahon Line in NEFA, but China would keep the disputed territory in Aksai Chin. Of the 47000 square miles of disputed land, Zhou’s Ceasefire gave a full 68% (the 32000 square miles of NEFA) to India and kept only 32% (the 15000 square miles of Aksai Chin) for China! Rather than “victor keeping the spoils,” Beijing kept only what was strategically vital; the area surrounding her critical military road in Aksai Chin. Zhou’s ceasefire dictum made it clear that the Indians would keep their troops twenty kilometers back from the ceasefire line, and that China “reserved the right to strike back” if India did so.

The Indian Army had no doubt about the response to the ceasefire. The new Chief of Army Staff, General Chaudhuri, reported that his forces were in no condition to do anything but reciprocate the Chinese move. However, the story was different for the politicians, as usual, whose most frequent use of the word was "humiliation." While the soldiers were relieved, the civilians took the unilateral Chinese ceasefire as rubbing salt in the wounds. There was nearly unanimous opinion to reject Beijing’s "offer" out of hand. Nehru played for time, simply saying that no official message about a ceasefire had been received from Beijing. As for negotiations, "our position … continues to be … that the position as it existed prior to September 8, 1962, shall be restored." The Opposition members denounced "a typical piece of calculated Chinese trickery" and demanded assurances that the Government would ignore the ceasefire and continue to refuse negotiations. One politician cried: "Decency, dignity and self-respect require that we negotiate only after the barbarians are driven out." As some called the Chinese move "fraudulent," others saw it as an ultimatum. All the Opposition Parties except the Communists issued a joint statement: "The Chinese offer of a unilateral ceasefire is only another of their notorious maneuvers, calculated to cause confusion and disruption in our national front, gain time for consolidation and build up for another infamous offensive and prevent us from mobilizing resources from inside and outside and create doubts in the minds of our friend in world democracy." The statement continued that the Prime Minister must not allow himself to be taken in, and the Government should reassure the nation that it would stand firmly by the policy of determined resistance and no negotiations.

When it was announced that the Chinese declaration was received that night, the spokesman refused to comment: "Let us wait and see." Neither then nor later would officials confirm that the troops had been ordered to observe the ceasefire, for that would be taken as admission that India had surrendered. In contrary, the Government strove to give the impression that India had just started to fight. Nehru fondly reassured a gathering of school-children: "The war with China will be long-drawn-out affair, it may take years – it may take so long that some of you will be fit and ready to fight it." In the following days, the Chinese diplomats were called to the Ministry of External Affairs for clarifications on the meaning of "line of actual control," and if the Chinese withdrew twenty kilometers, "where will that be?" Beijing described these questioning as meaningless. These were clearly spelled out in the ceasefire statement and restated by the diplomats, but the Indian Government complained that it was still vague and would require further elaboration "before the Chinese ceasefire proposals can be fully considered." What China intended, of course, fell short of what the Indians desired. The Indians wanted to restore the positions they had held prior to September 18 and to resume the positions inside the Chinese claim line in the west and north of the map-marked McMahon Line in the Thag La area. It was not enough for the Chinese to withdraw their troops. The Indians wanted all Chinese personnel to withdraw so that the Indians would return to their forward positions.

A week after the ceasefire, Zhou Enlai wrote to Nehru again and appealed for Indian reciprocation of the Chinese measures. He urged that the Chinese proposals had given "full consideration to the decency, dignity and self-respect of both sides," and argued that their implementation would not involve gain or loss of territory for either side. But he warned that Chinese withdrawal could not by itself be expected to prevent clashes, and that Indian refusal to cooperate would jeopardize the ceasefire. A sharply worded Chinese note of December 8 accused India of "deliberate haggling and evading an answer." Beijing put three blunt questions: "Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, to a ceasefire? … Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, that the armed forces of the two sides should disengage and withdraw each twenty kilometers from the November 7, 1959, line of actual control? … Does the Indian Government agree, or does it not agree, that officials of the two sides should meet…?" The Indian position to these questions was: "Yes and No." For domestic and international effect, Nehru and his colleagues were saying that the struggle with China would continue, and that the deceitful Chinese proposals must be rejected. But in fact the Indian Army was ordered to preserve the ceasefire and to avoid any provocation to the Chinese. It had no intention of moving right up to the McMahon Line again. The forward policy was dead, with the two or three thousand Indian soldiers lost in the fighting, but the fundamental position of the Indian Government had only been confirmed with no negotiations at their stand. But as from the beginning, the Indian reputation for a pacific approach was so high and the general opinion of China was so low that it was not difficult for India to clock the unyielding and unchanging refusal to negotiate and to shift the onus for preventing settlement to China. The border war was almost universally reported as an unprovoked Chinese invasion of India, which only confirmed the general impression that Beijing pursued a reckless, chauvinistic and belligerent foreign policy. The unilateral Chinese ceasefire and withdrawal was explained as a Russian ultimatum that brought it about, or that the U.S. had cleared its hands of the Cuba and was about to intervene. Others accepted the popular Indian explanation that the Chinese stop was "basically inspired by fear" because their lines of communication were overstretched and they became vulnerable to Indian counterattack. In time it was believed that, as Nehru put it, the Chinese had turned tail rather than face "the unexpected anger of the Indian people when aroused."

The Border issue, however one puts it, continues till today, as no settlement regarding the disputed areas have been reached. The 1962 military mandate remains the de facto settlement that both sides agree to on a private stand. Publicly, the dispute is still a long way from being resolved.