Previously, The Chinese retaliation to the Indian forward policy was nothing short of a complete wash-out of the Indian troops. India should have stuck to diplomatic means of settling the border issue. But now, India must find a way around this humiliation. It has already declined the opportunity for fresh starts at negotiation.

Dealing with the Dragon…

New Delhi was hot: a solution needed to be reached regarding the Border War. The humiliation caused at the hands of the Chinese was overwhelming. To have accepted Zhou Enlai’s October 24 Proposal would have meant Indian surrender to the Chinese. This was unacceptable. To keep up India’s face in the World stage, Nehru had to devise a plan to get around the Chinese military and turn defeat into victory. He sought foreign help. The Americans sympathized and agreed on sending out a Carrier ship to the Bay of Bengal at the earliest. India had to hold off the Chinese till then. With the American support, India decided to go all out this time; “October may be Chinese, but November is always Indian.” The message was clear, “to remove the Chinese from the sacred soils of India”. The only question now remained was “How?” General Kaul resumed charge in the Eastern Sector. His main objective was to reinforce the Se La-Bomdi La area. Bomdi La was the northernmost point which allowed for a logistic buildup. Se La also appeared to be quite a defensible position. Se La Pass dominated the road to Tawang and there were dominating peaks on both sides of the Pass. At more than fourteen thousand feet altitude, Se La was definitely “high ground”, but the problem was that the weather was harsh. Plus, the altitude made supply by air more difficult. Logistical problems never left the Indians. There was the added parameter of covering a large area of inhospitable terrain, just to protect against the unconventional routes taken by the Chinese. This time India could not afford to be swarmed in from all sides. Over the next few days, the Se La-Bomdi La defense began to form. Se La was sporadically supplied by air. Manpower build up was the prime objective for the moment.

Walong area was another one which needed a strong defensive line. But the numerous changes in command and differences in opinions made this task even more difficult. The Eleventh Brigade of the Second Division was the third one to be stationed there. But the stance they took was definitely not one of defense; it more of looked like an attacking formation. Indeed, as General Kaul revealed later, they had planned a “first major success against the enemy” after the October onslaught. On November 14^th, two companies of the Kumaon battalion supported by mortars and artillery, launched an assault against a strategic hill held by company of Chinese fire, then stopped fifty yards from the crest, exhausted. They needed at least a night’s rest before they could re-engage in such brutal combat; this time they were showing promise. There were more Chinese casualties then the Indians’. The next day, they would wipe off the entire Chinese front in the area.

Providence and China had other plans, though. The Chinese went for a midnight counter-attack, clearing the Indians off the hill. The survivors, less than half the attacking force, returned to Walong. The Chinese continued pursuit and infiltrated the main Indian defenses. The Indian artillery could not assist the defence; all rounds had been fired in the attack on the hill. Key defensive positions were overrun, and a withdrawal was ordered at 10 a.m. on November 16^th. But many Indians did not receive the order, and fought to the death at their positions. Even many of those who withdrew could not escape the various Chinese ambushes or the harshness of Nature. The withdrawing General Kaul sent a rather frantic message to New Delhi:

“The Enemy strength is now so great and his overall strength so superior that you should ask the highest authorities to get such foreign armed forces to come to our aid as are willing to do so…it seems beyond capability of our armed forces to stem the tide of the superior Chinese forces which he has and will continue to concentrate against us to our disadvantage. This is not a counsel of fear, but facing stark realities.”

Only hours after the Walong defeat, fighting resumed in both Aksai Chin and Se La. In Ladakh, the western Command continued a steady buildup of forces. The only Indian forces left in Chinese claimed territory were in Chusul village; all other Indian posts in the Chinese claimed territory had either withdrawn or wiped out. Western Command had made Chusul as their blocking point between the Chinese and the city of Leh. It is notable that the positions around Chusul were at 14000 feet altitude: there was no wood for fires or for constructing bunkers, frozen ground had to be blasted for entranchments, and even acclimatized troops could work only for short periods. Yet, some strong positions were in place by November 17^th. In the early hours of November 18^th, Chinese artillery opened fire on the Indian outposts. Mortars and rockets also softened the Indian entrenchments. The Chinese attempted a frontal infantry attack, but it was repelled. India was better at close range direct combat. Soon, though, the Chinese moved to envelop the Indian positions, a move with which they had disbanded the Indians innumerable times. This time around the fighting was more serious, casualties running high on both sides. Many were killed by the shear cold itself. Five hours into the attack, the Chinese finally got the upper-hand and forced the evacuation of the Indians beyond their claimed territory. The war in the Western Sector was over. Not a single Indian force remained within the Chinese claimed territory. By the end of November 18^th, all of Aksai Chin was in Chinese hands.

In the Se La sector, by November 17^th, simultaneous with Chusul, the manpower buildup was continuous and without resistance. Concentrated, these forces would have been formidable, but they were dispersed in a wide area to check Chinese surprise attacks. The Chinese did adopt such a technique again. They attacked the relatively weak mountain trail called the Bailey Trail. Radio reports indicated that the Chinese had wiped out the Indian forced there. But Headquarters could not believe that the Chinese could bring an entire battalion through a mountain pass. A second battle force was sent to check the Chinese inflow, thus weakening the defenses at the Headquarters at Bomdi La. The second company dug in at Thembang. A Chinese force of around 1500 attacked the company soon after midday. The Indians resisted for three hours, inflicting heavy Chinese casualties. But logistics problems struck again: the Indians began to run out of ammunition. With darkness falling, the Indian company began to withdraw. But in the darkness and thick vegetation, the orderly withdrawal soon turned into chaotic flight. None of the company returned to Bomdi La; weeks later, stragglers began appearing on the plains to the south. Once more, a superior Chinese Force and the logistics problems for Indians led to another Indian defeat.

There was only a brief bright moment for Indians on November 17^th. Simultaneous with the Bailey Trail action, the Chinese had launched an attack on Se La. But Se La was well defended; between dawn and mid-afternoon, the Chinese launched five assaults on Se La, and five times they were repulsed. With five battalions plus artillery, the Se La force was strong—until, of course, its main supply route was cut off when the Chinese took Thembang. With this, new questions arose in the minds of those stationed at Se La. Were they to continue defending, hoping for air supply? Or should the force withdraw, and if so could it break through the Chinese road block? The headquarters, too, was in jeopardy. Brigadier Singh, the commander at Se La requested guidance from General Kaul. After much discussion between the Generals, Kaul, Sen and Thapar, the order passed was this:

“You will hold your present position to the best of your ability. When the position becomes untenable I delegate the authority to you to withdraw to any alternative position, you can hold….You may be cut off by the enemy…your only course of action is to fight it out to as best as you can.”

The wording of this order, hardly, constituted clear guidance. The commander at Se La ordered the troops to make way through to Bomdi La. But Chinese ambushes soon ended the attempt. The Indian troops ran directly into enemy fire. The troops headed chaotically south for the plains. In their retreat, many were killed or captured.

By mid-morning of November 18^th, the Forty Eighth Brigade, stationed at Bomdi La was the only Indian Army force left in NEFA. They had artillery and mortars, and were expecting reinforcements. But poor command, control and communications again struck the Indians. At 11 am Gen. Kaul, not knowing that Se La had been abandoned, ordered a mobile column at Bomdi La to reinforce Se La. Brigadier Singh protested that such a move would only weaken Bomdi La. But Kaul angrily ordered two infantries with tanks and artillery, to move out to Se La. Support personnel, cooks and clerks, were ordered to aid the defense at Bomdi La. The Chinese could not let such a fine opportunity to pass. Ten minutes after the column left, they attacked. The first attack was beaten off; the infantry in column was quickly ordered back to their defensive positions. But these positions were already occupied by the Chinese, and the Indians were caught in the open. A second, stronger Chinese assault followed. Many Indian positions were overrun, and the Chinese brought fire onto the Brigade headquarters; attempts to counter-attack failed. By 4 p.m., Brigadier Singh ordered a withdrawal to Rupa, eight miles to the south.

The Brigade began to organize a defense around Rupa on the night of November 18^th. Then, Singh received orders from the Fourth Corps to withdraw to Foothills, just above the plains. As he began his withdrawal, he received orders from General Kaul to defend Rupa! Turning back, he found that the Chinese were already taking positions around Rupa; thus, defense of Rupa was impossible. His Forty-Eighth Brigade was then ordered to Chaku, the next defensible position down the road. The Chinese harassed the retreating troops, and they broke contact. The Brigade, now only one battalion in size, reached Chaku on the evening of November 19^th. The Chinese struck at midnight, with its notorious Three Prong Infiltration Attack. They had attacked an ammunition supply train, and the burning vehicles illuminated the Indian defensive positions. The Brigade broken, scattered groups made their way southwards to the plains. Remaining Indian command elements were headed far to the south. With the disintegration of the Forty-Eighth Brigade at 3 a.m. on November 20^th, no organized Indian military force was left in NEFA (nor in Aksai Chin, for that matter). Militarily, the Chinese victory was complete, and the Indian defeat absolute!!!

Late on the evening of November 20^th, Prime Minister Nehru made an urgent and open appeal to the United States for armed intervention against the Chinese; he asked for bomber and fighter squadrons to begin air strikes on Chinese troops in Indian Territory “if they continued to advance” and cover for Indian cities “in case the Chinese Air Force tried to raid them.” An American Carrier was dispatched towards the Bay of Bengal; but the Carrier was ordered back on November 21^st, as the victorious Chinese had ordered a ceasefire effective midnight, November 21, 1962.

Next time on “1962 – The Untold Story?”: American Carrier has returned in compliance with the Ceasefire called out by the Chinese. The conditions of Ceasefire and the Indian response to it will be discussed in “Ceasefire”, the next gripping edition of this series.