Previously, even with negotiations out of question and India’s progressive march, China kept her nerve during India’s initial mind games and put her forces on leash. But with India’s growing insolence on her boundary, China soon finds herself left with no other choice. Counter-aggression is the only way out, come what may. At least, India on her own is no match for China’s military. 

The Empire Strikes Back…

October 9, 1962 was fateful, not only for a fifty-man patrol squad, but for the two great Asian nations as well. The patrol squad reached Tseng Jong, a vantage position on the 16,000 foot Yumtso La Pass in the disputed Tawang region, north of the MacMahon Line. Earlier General John Dalvi, Commander of the Seventh Brigade had argued with General Kaul over the futility of this patrol. The region was clearly Chinese; the squad also lacked the military resources and the winter clothing to engage in combat at this alarmingly cold and inhospitable terrain. “Despite all these difficulties," Kaul decided to proceed with Operation Leghorn and to order the more heavily armed Seventh Brigade into an attack, with the conviction that China would not resist in the Eastern Sector, even when signs of resistance could be seen in the Western Sector at Aksai Chin. As calculated, the fifty man patrol squad assumed position at Tseng Jong, meeting zero resistance on its path. Little did they know that bloody fighting and the real Indo-China Border War was only a few hours away…

At daybreak on October 10, the squad began to move towards the Yumtso La bridges. Within a moments notice the whole squad came under serious fire from heavy mortars. The Chinese had allowed the squad to walk right into their Chakravyuha. The squad faced 360 degree attack. The Chinese, outnumbering the Indians twenty-to-one, had swiftly and secretively assumed battle positions all around the Indian patrol. With, what was later referred to as the “Red Ant Swarm Attack” by the Indian Army and the “Human Ripple Wave Attack” by the civilian critics, the Chinese forced the Indians to disengage and retreat to the river; further engagement would have meant disaster. The Chinese held their fire as the survivors crossed the river. The squad had suffered 50% casualties in a matter of minutes. The Chinese buried the Indian dead with full military honours, in plain view of the retreating Indian comrades withdrawing south of the river.

The brief battle at Tseng Jong had grave implications. The Chinese had attacked with force and determination. Most importantly, they did not retire to General Kaul’s assumption. The conviction of unassailability was expounded. On October 12^th, Nehru ordered the troops to build up as many posts as possible along the MacMahon Line. It was evident that the Chinese were making preparations for an attack: their troops and supply build-ups provided ample indication of pending assault. The primary concern was to retain the tactically important position at Tsang Le. It was their highway to a flank attack to Chinese positions below Thag La Ridge. Tsang Le though, was not only north of the MacMahon Line, but also was inside Bhutan. The troops were ordered to ignore the Line and the boundary. But the region was protected by two full-fledged battalions ready for both close-range and aerial assaults. Tsang Le was not to be lost to the opposition at any cost!

As the Indians reinforced their main tactical positions, the Chinese planned another Human Ripple Wave attack. On the night of October 19-20, three regiments of Chinese troops prepared and deployed for their assault on the Indian Seventh Brigade in Namka Chu River Area, which was relatively weakly guarded in the respect that the Indians expected the Chinese to enter the region through five bridges which were the only direct routes to their stronghold. But they overlooked the fact that this terrain was fordable. The Chinese used the fords to swarm in on the Indian post at Namka Chu. Though the attack was all-round, the weight of the Chinese attack was concentrated in the centre of the River line. The Indians fought fiercely against overwhelming odds, but their positions were overrun one-by-one. By 9 a.m. the Chinese had secured the river-line. Not only had the Chinese readily taken Indian positions, but they also cut the Indian telephone lines. The Seventh Brigade quickly lost cohesion as a fighting force and was granted permission to withdraw. The Chinese plan was to cut-off both escape and possible re-supply. But they did allow the retreating Indians out of the riverline, who finally made it to safe Indian posts at Tawang. All this while, Tsang Le, so important to Gen. Kaul, was ignored, probably because the Chinese Maps (like the Indians’) showed Tsang Le in Bhutan. A large assault-team was, thus, misplaced. Gen. Kaul had resolved to his attack plan to such an extent that he slackened the defences in other areas, a blunder which proved disastrous, as by October 22^nd the Seventh Brigade effectively ceased to exist as a fighting force.

The Chinese, by now had broken all leashes of constraint. Tawang Tract was their next target. The Indians reinforced Se La Pass. General L. P. Sen, Commander-in Chief of Eastern Command, ordered the remnants of the Indian troops – two infantry battalions and some artillery – to “hold Tawang at all costs”. But the Indians had suffered two successive defeats at the hands of the opposition; the morale was clearly down. The Chinese had proved to be unpredictable. With another such attack, the Eastern Sector would be completely lost. This impression did not prove to be wrong. The Chinese did come up with another military masterpiece: the Three Prong Infiltration attack. Quickly and effectively, the Chinese held positions around Tawang from three different angles, over-running any small posts that came in their way. They maintained a radius of ten miles from the Indian stronghold. The Indians decided to withdraw; this attack was not one to be blocked, but rather to be dodged. By October 24-25, The Eastern Sector fell into a lull, with majority of Chinese forces paused in Tawang, about ten miles south of the MacMahon Line.

Meanwhile, there had been significant fighting in the Western Sector, in Aksai Chin. On October 20^th, simultaneous with the Thag La Ridge Attack, the hinese assaulted Indian posts in the Chip Chap Valley, Galwan Valley, and the Pangong Lake. The Galwan Post had been surrounded by the Chinese in August, and thence been supplied by air. Galwan post was finally attacked and overrun on October 20^th; after reporting that the Chinese had begun to shell the post, it was not heard from again. Numerous small posts were soon overwhelmed and scant garrisons were either captured or killed. The Western Command soon recognized the magnitude of the Chinese attack, and many of the small, isolated posts withdrew to the south-west. On October 21^st, after heavy fighting, the Chinese took posts at the north side of Pangong Lake. By pulling troops back, General Daulat Singh of the western Command had methodically and rapidly built up strength to prepare for any further Chinese attacks. But the Chinese kept to the north of the Macartney-MacDonald Line, which they claimed to be the official boundary. For two weeks hence, the Chinese put leash on their military activity. They had proved their military strength to the Indians.

The Chinese Premier, Zhou Enlai, did not want to close the doors on a diplomatic settlement. On October 24^th, he sent a letter to Nehru proposing:

1. a negotiated settlement of the boundary,
2. that both sides disengage and withdraw twenty kilometers from the present lines of actual control
3. a Chinese withdrawal north in NEFA, and
4. that China and India not cross lines of present control in Aksai Chin.

Nehru’s reply of October 27 appeared eager to restore peace and friendly relations, but questioned a mutual twenty kilometer withdrawal after “40 or 60 kilometers of blatant military aggression”. Nehru proposed, instead, a return to the “boundary prior to 8 September, 1962” before any Chinese attacks; only then would India be interested in talks. Zhou’s reply came on November 4^th, and clarified his intent of ‘line of actual control’. It was the traditionally claimed Macartney-MacDonald Line in Aksai Chin and the MacMahon Line in the NEFA.

Simultaneously, external forces began to influence the Border War situation. Russia, India’s supporter through the 1950s, was endorsing the Chinese peace proposal. But in early November Russia was pre-occuppied with the Cuban Missile Crisis, and paid little attention to the Border War. India saw in this a loss to China, while India still had support of Britain and the United States. Military supplies from both the countries began arriving in early November. The Americans seemed eager to help India against the perceived menace of Communism; Washington also made plans to send a carrier task force to the Bay of Bengal. The political activities also continued. On November 8^th, the Indian Parliament proclaimed a state of National Emergency and adopted a resolution to “drive out the aggressors from the sacred soils of India.” Through the first two weeks of November, China had refrained from any further assaults; Beijing obviously wanted a diplomatic resolution. On November 14^th, Nehru wrote another letter to Zhou, again rejecting Zhou’s October 24 proposal, and again refuting any Chinese border claims. The immediate effect of the letter was that the fighting resumed. China initiated the assault this time as “a gift for Prime Minister Nehru on his birthday”.

Next time on “1962 – The Untold Story?” : The Indian washout at the hands of the China has made this war, a matter of dignity for India. India cannot sit idly and be humiliated by this retaliation. India decides to go in all out. “October may be Chinese, but November is always Indian” – with this conviction India decides on “Dealing with the Dragon”, in the next exciting edition of this series.

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