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Previously, China is faced with a disturbing dilemma. India is breaching into her
backyard, slowly but surely. All attempts at a peaceful solution have yielded
next to nothing. To reply in kind would rouse the wraths of the World Powers,
who have clearly shown their allegiance to India. Still, compromise on the
territorial integrity of the Homeland is unacceptable. China must act,
but with caution against this Indian pressure.
Clash
of Nerves…
In early
1961, the Chinese began to react vigorously on the ground. As the Indians set
up a post overlooking a Chinese position, the Chinese promptly took up more
positions around it. Since April 1959, the Chinese also resumed the suspended
patrol in the western sectors and warned to resume patrolling everywhere if
Indians continued the forward movement. As Nehru assured Parliament that the
position in the western sector was "more advantageous to India,"
the forwarding Indians in the Ladakh were outnumbered by the Chinese by more
than five to one. The strength disparity was beyond the numbers. The Chinese
were concentrated where the Indians were scattered; the Chinese were able to
move in trucks where the Indians trekked on foot; and the Chinese had all
regular supports arms for the troops while the Indian Brigade had nothing
beyond one platoon of medium machine-guns. The Chinese ranged heavy mortars and
recoilless guns on the Indian posts, and infantry equipped with automatic
rifles. The Indians had nothing heavier than three-inch mortars and most posts
even lacked those, their troops equipped with rifles last seen in action before
the First World War.
China warned that the continued Indian "pressing on the
Chinese post and carrying out provocation" would compel the Chinese troops
to defend themselves, and that India
would be responsible for the consequences. The Indian Government dismissed the
warnings as bluff and the threatening Chinese moves as bluster. In the Chip
Chap valley, the Chinese formed in assault formation and gave every indication
to wipe out the Indian post. Western Command requested permission to withdraw
the post, but Nehru believed that the Chinese were making a show of force to
test India’s
resolution and ordered to reinforce the post. The Chinese later did not follow
up on the threats, and the Indian Government and Army concluded the judgement
and nerve of the Prime Minister, further confirming the basic premise of the
forward policy, which was further validated by the subsequent Galwan incident.
The Indian
Amy map showed Galwan valley as one of the best routes to move into
Chinese-held territory, which was one of Kaul’s orders to establish a post in
November 1961. The terrain in the valley was extremely difficult and the
Chinese had already had a post there since at least 1959. After the winter passed,
Western Command decided that any move to threaten the well-established Chinese
post would certainly evoke a violent reaction, and concluded that no Indian
post could be established. But Kaul overruled the command. After over a month
of trekking, the Indians emerged on the upper reaches of the Galwan River,
and took positions, on July 5, 1962 to cut off a Chinese outpost and also hold
up a small Chinese supply party. On July 8, the Chinese first made diplomatically
"strongest protest" asking for immediate withdrawal of the Indian
troops and warning that China
would not "give up its right to self-defense when unwarrantedly
attacked." India
replied that India
has "regularly been patrolling the Galwan valley" and has "never
encountered any Chinese infiltrators" there, and lodged "an emphatic
protest" against the Chinese "unwarranted aggressive activity"
on the ground. India warned China to be entirely responsible for any
untoward incident if China
did not "stop the incessant intrusions deep inside Indian
territory and ceaseless provocative activities against Indian
border guards." The Chinese reacted on the ground advancing on the Indian
post with a company in assault formation and quickly building up to battalion
strength. In response, the External Affairs Ministry called the Chinese
Ambassador and warned that the garrison would open fire if the Chinese troops
pressed any closer to the Galwan post, and that India would retaliate against
Chinese positions if the post were attacked. In a few days, the Chinese pulled
back a little while continuing to surround the post in relatively great
strength, cutting off the ground supply. Western Command requested for air
supply since any land approach would provoke a clash. India decided that, since China blinked
in the confrontation that now relaxed, the moral initiative must be maintained.
A small force was dispatched to reinforce Galwan. It was turned back under the
Chinese guns, which warned to fire if it advanced any farther. The Galwan post
was supplied by air until it was wiped out on October 20.
The news of
the Galwan incident appeared in India
on July 11, as a new and provocative Chinese advance into Indian
Territory. When the Chinese did not follow up on their physical
and diplomatic threats, a wave of triumph swept the press and the politicians.
It was believed that the incident raised the morale of the whole nation, and
the Chinese withdrew "in the face of the determined stand of the small
Indian garrison." The orders given to the Indian garrison were extended to
all Indian troops in the western sectors, and the "fire only if fired
upon" changed to "fire if the Chinese press dangerously close to your
positions." Nehru further decided that the military moves had to be coupled
with diplomatic pressure. Nehru assured the Indian Parliament with a proposal
that would withdraw very large Chinese and very small Indian withdrawal. It was
hoped that, with the establishment of Indian posts in Chinese-claimed
territory, China would accept
what the Indians considered to be the best way of saving face, the complete
withdrawal, and that the few Indian posts already established might have
brought China
to that position. China
rejected the proposal as "unilaterally imposed submissive terms" and
questioned: "Why should China
need to ask India’s
permission for using its own road on its own territory?" New
Delhi concluded that the forward policy had not yet presented
enough pressure and decided that it must be pursued until China accepted
to withdraw.
The Indian
troops pressed hard in the western sector, acting as if they were the vanguard
of a powerful army rather than the stake in a wild political gamble. Meanwhile
the domestic critics demanded stronger and quicker action against China. To defend
itself, the Government drew lines to connect the new forward Indian posts on
maps and calculated the enclosed area. One journalist praised the Prime
Minister for "a general advance over a wide front of 2,500 square
miles" and complimented Nehru as "a unique triumph for audacious
Napoleonic planning." Only sporadic report was made on the real situation
that the Chinese had a ten-to-one superiority in the western sector and also
all the advantages of terrain and communications. Most reported on the superior
strength and better equipment of the Indians over Chinese, the latter as
garrison troops of poor fighting quality. The Opposition in India further
pushed for yet stronger measures to expel the Chinese. It was claimed that
"The bogey of Chinese superiority … should not worry our military
experts" and that "two hundred Indian soldiers are equal to two
thousand of the Chinese," and asked "Why should we be afraid of them?
Why are we not able to hurl them back?" When the Indian Ambassador
(Nehru’s cousin) in Washington
expressed the truth that the Indian defense forces were so badly equipped that
they could not ensure the security of the country, he was ignored. Nehru
repeatedly assured Parliament that the Army was capable of defending the
frontiers, and suggested disciplining the Ambassador for an indiscretion.
Saner voices
in the Government suggested that India
should give China the same
pledge as it gave to Pakistan
with respect to the Pakistan-held and Indian-claimed part of Kashmir,
and a daily newspaper also urged the Government to negotiate. However, the
overwhelmingly dominant attitudes in Parliament were not to negotiate. After Kongka Pass
incident on July 21, 1962, China
protested. "China is
not willing to fight with India,
and the Sino-Indian boundary question can be settled only through routine
negotiations." China
had exercised self-restraint, but could not stand idle while the "frontier
guards are being encircled and annihilated by aggressors … If India should
ignore the warning and persist in its own way India must bear full responsibility
for all the consequences." India replied on July 26, reminding China that
under certain conditions India was prepared to "enter into further
discussions" on the boundary question. But India
was firm in its position that before any negotiations, China must withdraw all personnel from the
India-claimed territory, and when the evacuation was complete, India would meet China
at the conference table to discuss minor modifications of the boundary India claimed.
In response, China
reciprocated the reasonable and positive tone, but rejected the condition of
"one-sided withdrawal from large tracts of its own territory," while
accepting the proposal for discussion. "The Chinese Government approves of
the suggestion put forth by the Indian Government for further discussion … As a
matter of fact, if only the Indian side stop advancing into Chinese territory,
a relaxation of the border situation will be affected at once… The Chinese
Government proposes that such discussions be held as soon as possible..." India considered the discussions with China served no purpose since China explicitly rejected the "one-sided
withdrawal," which India
considered as the only acceptable settlement.
In the meantime, the new "great games" on the borders
were reaching climax. At the beginning of September, in the Chip Chap valley,
the Indians put into effect of the orders they had been given since the Galwan
confrontation, firing into and killing several Chinese who advanced close to
one of the Indian posts. By the end of August, the Indians had placed nearly
forty posts in Chinese-claimed territory, most staffed between a dozen to
thirty and fifty men. They were more than vulnerable, in fact helpless, as they
were outnumbered and outgunned. The question was not how long they could
resist, if they were attacked, but was how many Chinese they could kill before
being wiped out. They were the hostages of the Indian conviction, civilian and
military, that China
would never attack, as Kaul reported: "I am convinced that the Chinese
will not attack any of our positions even if they are relatively weaker than
theirs." The Chinese protests became more threatening as August passed
into September. "If the Indian side should insist on threatening by armed
force the Chinese border defense forces…. and thereby rouse their resistance,
it must bear the responsibility for all the consequences arising
therefrom."
Next time on “1962 – The Untold Story?”: The border skirmishes are nearing to a
conclusion. The Indian bluff seems to be fading to the light of Chinese
resolve, which is clearly losing patience. China cannot hold back any longer.
This insolence must be brought to heel. “The Empire Strikes Back” in the next
exciting edition of this series.
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