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Previously, The negotiations between India
and China
have not been able to settle the border issue. Each nation is backing up her
strategic and political interests with equal tenacity. Though China would like to avoid an armed conflict, India has
retired to the fact that routine negotiations are not going to provide a
solution. India
decides on a Forward Policy, to clean up the Chinese mess in her northern
boundaries. She marches right into the disputed area of Aksai Chin.
India Marches…
India’s advance into Aksai Chin came to
be called “police action” by critics in India; that "to
defend your own territory is not to wage war" and that “if you throw out
bandits …[it] is just police action on your own territory." "We as a
peaceful nation who are members of the UN do not believe in war as any remedy …
therefore … the only way is to have a police action whereby we can push the
Chinese out of our territory … after that have a basis for negotiation."
Others argued that war was not the ultimate catastrophe or even an unmixed
evil. It was believed that small and local wars could not always be avoided,
and "when such wars are fought … the wisdom of the world" would
localize them and would find a workable solution later. "So we need not
scare ourselves that any resistance to Chinese aggression will lead to a world
war and a destruction of humanity. The world will see to it that this does not
happen." It was further emphasized that "it is conflict that brings
out the best in a country, that brings about unity," and that the danger
would be turned to good effect "to achieve national cohesion and spur
national endeavor."
However, Nehru
consistently stressed the dangers of war, that "war between India and China would be one of the major
disasters of the world … for it will mean world war … which will be indefinite.
We would not be able to limit it in time, because it will not be possible for China to defeat us and it will be impossible for
us to march up to Peking across Tibet."
In the rhetoric allusions to the ultimate possibility of war, the conceived
context was that India
was going to war for its territory after exhausting its patience and gaining a
position of strength. It never occurred to New Delhi that war might arise from Chinese
reaction to or anticipation of Indian moves. Nehru and his colleagues were
unwavering in their faith that whatever India
did along the borders, China
would not attack. This basic assumption was the basis of the forward policy, a
military challenge to a militarily far superior neighbour.
The Indian armed forces had been neglected in
the 1950s. Nehru and Indian Congress ruled out possible threats to India one by one, and concluded that "no
danger threatens India
from any direction, and even if there is any danger we shall be able to cope
with it." As for China,
the Himalayas made "an effective barrier
and not even air fleets could come that way." It was believed that its
size, its geo-strategic position and the interest of the great powers would
keep India
immune from any significant external attacks. "If any power was covetous
enough to make the attempt" to acquiring the commanding position,
"all the others would combine to trounce the intruder. This mutual rivalry
would in itself be the surest guarantee against an attack on India."
Nehru held this rational and pragmatic view of external threats to India after
independence and until the main Chinese assault in November 1962. The Indian
Government stressed on development to come first. Military aid from abroad was
considered unacceptable since it would impair India’s non-alignment and be
unreliable. The positively pacific, almost pacifist approach to international
relations, the emphasis on development, and insistence on non-alignment, all
reinforced the Gandhian disapproval of men of war as part of the Indian
Congress attitude. The civilian leadership thus placed the soldiers into
disadvantaged position. After Menon became the Defense Minister in 1957, he was
warmly welcomed for being energetic and politically relevant. The military had
misgivings about Menon’s interference in steadily promoting officer Kaul, who
played a central and disastrous role in the border war. Following its
conception in the beginning of 1960, the total lack of military means made the
Army resist the implementation of the forward policy until the end of 1961.
By the spring of 1961, Nehru found the Chinese
position unchanged. China
was still ready, indeed eager, to negotiate a boundary settlement with India, while indicating that China would
agree to the McMahon Line. In the fall of 1961, Nehru Government gave
categorical orders for immediate implementation of the forward policy. China
protested about forward moves already made from Demchok that "the Chinese
Government has been following with great anxiety the Indian troops"
pressing forward on China’s borders in "gross violations of China’s
territory and sovereignty," which would have serious consequences had it
not been orders to avoid conflicts. India asserted that the Indian
patrols were moving into their own territory and rejected the Chinese protest
as unwarranted interference in their internal affairs, as they viewed that
"according to our thinking our trouble at the border is not a dispute at
all."
As a demonstration of military power, India sent its army into Goa
and liberated it from the Portuguese Imperialists. The Portuguese were easily
“thrown out”. The easy victory over the Portuguese encouraged the hope of
similar success against the Chinese. The Home Minister,
Lal Bahadur Shastri, paralleled the Goa incident with China: “If the Chinese will not vacate the areas
… India will have to repeat
what she did in Goa.” However, the military
operation in Goa did not test the capabilities
of the troops or their commanders, as the Portuguese put up no organized
resistance against the overwhelmingly superior Indian forces. The Army had been
experiencing chronic shortage of boots, and half of one battalion went through
the operation in canvas gym shoes. Although this was discussed widely in the
Army, little came out in India,
which called the operation "our finest hour."
Nehru had repeatedly assured Parliament and
public that the Army and other services were stronger than they have been, and
were ready to defeat any challenges to the integrity of India. The
Indian army would quickly teach the Chinese a lesson in the event of a
conflict. Nehru said that the boundary dispute with China
was more important to India
than a hundred Goas. Although India
now had rejected the Chinese proposal for a joint twenty-kilometer withdrawal, China had
unilaterally stopped patrolling within twenty-kilometers of the bounder. India refused
to open negotiations, and steadily pushed forward, first in the middle and
eastern sectors and now in the west. China
warned that India’s
action "is most dangerous and may lead to grave consequences," but
"so far as the Chinese is concerned the door for negotiation is always
open." India insisted
that the Sino-Indian boundary had long been settled and justified the forward
policy as "the legitimate right, indeed the duty, of the Government of
India to take all necessary measures to safeguard the territorial integrity of India."
The forward policy continued as small Indian posts were being established
overlooking Chinese positions and sometimes astride the tracks or roads behind
them. The theory was that interruption of the communication lines would
ultimately force the Chinese to withdraw from their posts. Nehru dismissed the
increasingly emphatic Chinese warnings of "grave consequences," and
explained to Parliament that the Chinese became "rather annoyed" as
the Indian posts were set up behind their own. Nehru reassured the doubtful
members who thought Chinese tone dangerous: "There is nothing to be
alarmed at, although the (Chinese) note threatens all kinds of steps," and
that "if they do take those steps we shall be ready for them."
India had all the
advantages of world opinions, the press and governments of the Western world
cheered India as it stood
against what they believed to be the expansionist China. The historical and
documentary arguments about the boundary were too obscure except for the
specialists, to whom the archives that might show which side was nearer the
truth were closed. Although the invasion of Goa injured India’s
reputation, there was generally no hesitation in the West to take the Indian
side. As Felix Green explained the American reaction: "So solidly built
into our consciousness is the concept that China
is conducting a rapacious and belligerent foreign policy that whenever a
dispute arises in which China
is involved, she is instantly assumed to have provoked it. All commentaries,
‘news reports,’ and scholarly interpretations are written on the basis of this
assumption. The cumulative effect of this only further reinforces the original
hypothesis so that it is used again next time with even greater effect."
The Americans viewed the conflict as a race between China
and India for the economic
and political leadership in Asia. In 1959,
then Senator JF Kennedy said: "We want India
to win that race with China
…if China succeeds and India
fails the economic-development balance of power will shift against us."
The British Government’s support for India
was as solid as that of the US
except for a division of opinion. Some officials in the Foreign Office pointed
out that India’s
account of the historical argument for the boundaries was inflated and
recommended less than categorical British support for the Indian claims. But as
British viewed that its interest was concerned, it gave wholehearted and
unqualified support for India.
China
was thus cornered, or so it seemed. With the world powers at her back, India marched
into the disputed territory confident of victory through Chinese surrender.
Next time on “1962 – The Untold Story?”: China has to take immediate action. She is caught
between attacking and pushing the enemy back from her backyard, and still
keeping her position safe in the world scenario; she cannot afford
confrontation with USA and Great Britain with India at her borders. India, on the other hand, though challenged
militarily in comparison to China,
is insisting on keeping the pressure on the Chinese neighbours. Can she
maintain her upper hand in this “Clash of Nerves”, in the next
edition of this series?
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