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Previously, the borders of India
and China,
still undecided, called forth diplomatic negotiations between the two nations.
The nature of the talks revealed each country’s reluctance for submitting
certain areas along the borders to the other side. Each had her own interests
in Aksai Chin and Tawang.
Strategic
Interests… A. G. Noorani observed, most
accurately, “It is as impossible for India
to cede Tawang to China as
it is for China
to cede the Aksai Chin.”
Aksai
Chin:
The British had earlier made Aksai Chin a
strategic area to keep Russian advance from India, but had never proposed it as
a boundary and reflected in the extension of administration, which was far
beyond the British capacity. However, India categorically claimed Aksai
Chin as part of the northern border and Nehru ruled it as "a firm and
definite one which was not open to discussion with anybody." But from a
balanced point of view, Aksai Chin was more readily accessible to China than to India. China
used the ancient trade route leading from Sinkiang into Tibet. Through the first half of
the 1950s, China used the
Aksai Chin route to supply western Tibet. China
even constructed a military highway running right across the Aksai Chin
plateau, in an area which India
claimed to be her own (to the south of the Johnson Line) and China believed
to be hers (north of the Macartney-MacDonald Line). The irony is, the road was
discovered by India
more than a year after its construction. The highway and the military posts
along it were interpreted at New Delhi
as Chinese attempt at claiming the lands. The Chinese were resistant towards
the subsequent protest of India.
They rejected the Indian complaint of ‘intrusion’. To China, Aksai Chin was, now, of
great military importance. It marked China’s final military post in the
west between the two great nations. As Nehru was categorical about the entire
boundary, Zhou Enlai was categorical about Aksai Chin as it "has always
been under Chinese jurisdiction" and that “the Chinese guards have
continually patrolled it”. Zhou, as a defensive response, brought forward the
dispute again. He questioned the legality of the Johnson Line in the west and
the MacMahon Line in the East.
These
talks between New Delhi and Beijing were not unaccompanied by a few
border skirmishes from both sides. The public needed to be informed of these
minor outbreaks. Nehru coolly validated that the road existed "through a
corner of our north-eastern Ladakhi territory" and affirmed that the
Chinese claimed of "the hundreds of miles of Indian
territory" was "totally and manifestly
unacceptable" and was not "a matter of discussion." Nehru stated
a few days later the importance of the "two miles of territory in the high
mountains, where nobody lives" entail "national prestige and
dignity." He stressed that China
"having accepted broadly the McMahon Line, I am prepared to discuss any
interpretation of the McMahon Line" and "to have arbitration of any
authority agreed to by the two parties." About the western sector of the
border, Nehru was vague: "The point is, there has never been any
delimitation there in that area and it has been a challenged area," but he
maintained that "Aksai Chin was and had always been the historic
frontiers" of India.
Tawang:
Alastair Lamb,
one of the most eminent scholars on the dispute of boundary between India and China, put the position of Tawang
in the balance of power, in this manner:
“Tawang north of
the Se La [Pass] was a district which could also have been returned to Tibet at any
time before 1947 without sacrifice of Indian interests. It did not, it would
seem, actually come under direct Indian administration until 1951, and at the
end of British rule in India it was still controlled by Tibet, just as it had
been before 1914. Tawang south of the Se La, however, had by 1947 definitely
come under Indian control. The retention of this region, moreover, was clearly
essential on strategic grounds so as to avoid a salient of Tibetan (and, by
1947, potentially Chinese) territory thrusting right to the edge of the Brahmaputra valley. If, however, all these possible
modifications had been made, then India would have reduced its theoretical
limits by perhaps less than a 1,000 square miles and this would have
represented the maximum adjustment of the McMahon Line that any Tibetan
government could have reasonably expected”
The evaluation
of Charles Bell, who knew Tawang like the back of his hand, focuses more
precisely on the strategic importance Tawang holds for India; he
warned in 1910:
“If the Chinese
regain control over Tibet, later on they will pay special attention to the
development and consolidation of the at present thinly populated but warm and
fertile districts in the southwest of Tibet, which are not far from Assam and
from which districts, when developed, a considerable army could be fed.” He
further added in a confidential evaluation, “Until the recent Tibet Mission,
and the resulting growth of Chinese power in Tibet… China had very little power and
there were no signs of her being aggressive on the Indian frontier…. The
position is now completely damaged. China is becoming every year more
formidable as a military power. She has seized the power in Tibet and is
increasing her military strength there more and more. Only a narrow stretch of
territory intervenes between her conquests and the plains of India. And
these conditions apply to 1,100 miles of frontier, i.e. from the north-west
corner of Nepal to the
north-east corner of Assam.
It is of vital importance to keep China and all foreign powers out of
this narrow stretch of territory.”
Thus, Tawang was
the buffer India needed
against the growing military strength of China. Nehru did well to heed to
this warning. He was insistent that the MacMahon Line decided upon in the
Shimla Conference, 1914, should stand as the clear boundary between India and Tibet. From 1956 to 1960, China was
prepared to accept the MacMahon Line. In his talks with Nehru in New Delhi in April, 1960,
Zhou Enlai accepted the Line: “We make no claims in the eastern sector to areas
south of the MacMahon Line.” We cannot, only on the basis of this statement
paint a halo over China’s
head. China had her own
interests in allowing India
to claim Tawang. The Burmese were displeased with China’s
entry into Tibet.
To cede Tawang to India was the only practical way
for China
to go on without creating intractable and poisonous disputes with every
neighbor. Again she had to uphold the newly forged ties of “peaceful
coexistence” as per the Panch Sheel pact; "China
will not be so foolish as to antagonize the United
States in the east and again to antagonize India
in the west."
To
Each Her Own:
India could not
give up Tawang, nor could China,
Aksai Chin. Each forwarded her own claims to these territories. Yet, with India hesitant
to cede Aksai Chin, breaches into the Aksai Chin areas were initiated. It was decided that
India
"must assert its rights by dispatching properly equipped patrols into the
areas currently occupied by the Chinese, since any prolonged failure to do so
will imply a tacit acceptance of Chinese occupation, and … Indian patrols
penetrate into disputed areas of Ladakh." It reflected
Nehru’s perception that the unique position of India in the world, with the
reputation and depth of its pacific instincts, would go with the Indian patrols
into Aksai Chin like a moral armor. Nehru and his colleagues held this belief
that the Chinese would stand idly while India gradually and laboriously
built up positions of strength. The confidence in the moral unassailability was
embedded in the belief that the Chinese were reluctant to use force and if the
Chinese did attack, it would rebound against them.
Next
time on “1962 – The Untold Story?”: India has had enough talking. If
the Chinese do not vacate the territory India
claims to be hers, India
will have to take up police action.
The next part
“India
Marches” covers India’s
Forward Policy towards China
and shows the prelude to the great war of 1962.
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