The Dominoes Start Falling …

On July 1, 1954 Nehru wrote a fateful Note to the External Affairs Ministry’s Secretary-General and the Foreign Secretary: “All our old maps dealing with this frontier should be carefully examined and, where necessary, withdrawn. New maps should be printed showing our northern and north-eastern frontier without any reference to any ‘line’. These new maps should also not state there is any undemarcated territory… this frontier should be considered a firm and definite one which is not open to discussion with anybody”.

Here 'line' understandably refers to the famous MacMahon Line in the north east and the very controversial Johnson Line in the Northwest of the disputed boundary; ‘undemarcated territory’ refers most probably to the Macartney-MacDonald Proposal. Nehru’s determination to build a strict boundary without any reference to the aforesaid line was based on his belief that a well marked boundary would settle the disputes that China had in the past with British India. Although well-meant, he overlooked the possibility that his step of unilaterally altering the maps could be interpreted by the neighbour as a fresh claim of territory. Any settlement regarding the disputed areas should have been made through involvement of both parties.

Nehru’s demarche to Zhou Enlai, the Chinese Premier, on December 14, 1958, centered on the McMahon Line and on China’s maps. He did not mention the Aksai Chin or China’s road through it. It was Zhou who raised that in his reply of January 23, 1959, while promising “to take a more or less realistic attitude towards the McMahon Line”. Nehru’s rejoinder of March 22, 1959, cited a treaty of 1842 on Ladakh and claimed “the area now claimed by China has always been depicted as part of India on official maps”. This foreclosed compromise.

It was also factually untrue. The agreement of 1842 was not a boundary treaty but a treaty of non-aggression concluded after Zorawar Singh’s disastrous march into Tibet. If the boundary was, indeed, fixed, the British would not have appointed two Boundary Commissions in 1846 and 1847 jointly to define the Ladakh boundary with China. They made a formal proposal on March 14, 1899, proposing a line “for the sake of avoiding any dispute or uncertainty in the future”. Known as the Macartney-MacDonald Line, it left the Aksai Chin to China. Within the government, for nearly three quarters of a century after 1847, British officials debated on which boundary to adopt. On one point they were unanimous – it must be based on an agreement with China.

In his rejoinder to Nehru’s letter of March 22, banging the door on a compromise, Zhou wrote on September 8 to assert China’s claim on the Aksai Chin as also to question the McMahon Line. On September 26, Nehru wrote back to say that “such large areas” were not open to discussion and Chinese forces must withdraw to the line India claimed as its “traditional frontier”. When Zhou met Nehru in New Delhi in April 1960, he was prepared to yield on the McMahon Line if Nehru conceded the Aksai Chin. Nehru refused. Already by then China had recognised the Line, insofar as it extended to Burma, in the boundary agreement with Burma on January 28, 1960.

At the first meeting of the summit on April 20, Zhou told Nehru: “The one common feature in the boundary between China and Burma and India is the presence of the McMahon Line. We stated that we do not recognise the McMahon Line but that we were willing to take a realistic view with Burma and India.”

At his press conference on April 25, Zhou defined the boundary in the west as “the line which runs from the Karakoram Pass south eastward roughly along the watershed of the Karakoram Mountains to the Kongka Pass”. He also said: “China has no boundary dispute with Sikkim and Bhutan.”

Zhou formulated these six points at the press conference:

1. There exist disputes with regard to the boundary between the two sides.

2. There exists between the two countries a line of actual control upto which each side exercises administrative jurisdiction.

3. In determining the boundary between the two countries, certain geographical principles, such as watersheds, river valleys and mountain passes, should be equally applicable to all sectors of the boundary..

4. A settlement of the boundary question between the two countries should take into account the national feelings of the two peoples towards the Himalayas and the Karakoram Mountains.

5. Pending a settlement of the boundary question between the two countries through discussions, both sides should keep to the line of actual control and should not put forward territorial claims as pre-conditions, but individual adjustments may be made.

6. In order to ensure tranquility on the border so as to facilitate the discussions, both sides should continue to refrain from patrolling along all sectors of the boundary.

He repeated them in crisp formulations in a meeting with Nehru the next day as forming “a common ground”. They were:

1. Our boundaries are not delimited and, therefore, there is a dispute about these.

2. However, this [sic.] is a line of actual control both in the eastern sector as well as the western sector and also in the middle sector.

3. Geographical features should be taken into account in settling the border. One of the principles would be watershed and there would be also other features, like valleys and mountain passes, etc. These principles should be applicable to all sectors, eastern, western and middle.

4. Each side should keep to this line and make no territorial claims. This does not discount individual adjustments along the border later.

5. National sentiments should be respected. For both countries a lot of sentiment is tied around the Himalayas and the Karakoram”.

Nehru’s approach was radically different. “We should take each sector of the border and convince the other side of what it believes to be right” – an impossible exercise. It is truly amazing that Nehru should have considered this at all as a realistic option in international politics. It is unreal even in domestic politics. On the fourth point, renunciation of territorial claims by both, Nehru responded on April 24: “Our accepting things as they are would mean that basically there is no dispute and the question ends there; that we are unable to do.” A fine opportunity for compromise was lost.

Next time on “1962 – The Untold Story?”: As and as the talks fail to reach a solid conclusion, the dominoes fall towards an armed conflict. As to why Nehru is hesitant to agree to Zhou’s proposals, the answer may not be easy to find. Definitely, it is not one made under imperial adamancy. Then, foreseeing which strategic and political interests in the disputed areas, does Nehru take such a step? And why is Zhou insistent on retaining Aksai Chin, even at the cost of Tawang in the East? We will investigate these reasons in “Strategic Interests”, the next part of this series.

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